Joint Letter to the European Council Regarding Innovative Ways to Raise EU Own Resources

Dear European Heads of State and Government,

Dear Mr António Costa,

You are meeting in Brussels, on 20 & 21 March, and are expected to discuss new ways to raise EU own resources. The European Union faces an investment crisis. Mario Draghi’s landmark competitiveness report has called for significantly more public and private investment, urging the EU to invest an additional €800 billion per year. He stressed that the EU must match post-World War II investment levels, warning that otherwise Europe risks compromising its welfare, environment and global standard. 

Much of these investments are indispensable to bolster European industrial policy while reaching agreed green and social targets. The EU also needs to deliver on commitments towards low- and middle-income partner countries, including substantial resources for the new UNFCCC climate finance goal and to advance the SDGs.

New tax revenues are required to maintain sound public finances as we close the investment gap to ensure strong foundations for future generations. The European Commission issued valuable proposals for new own resources in 2023, and we regret that those proposals have not been agreed so far. The European Commission’s suggestions for new own resources include an EU-coordinated Financial Transaction Tax. Such a tax could collect between €17 and €43 billion every year. 

In addition to the European Commission’s existing suggestions for own resources, we urge you to consider additional innovative proposals and we would like to draw your attention in particular to three additional taxation options: 

• A tax on extreme wealth; 

• A tax on the profits and ownership of the fossil fuel industry; and 

• Aviation taxes. You will find more information on these taxation options in the attached annex. 

These initiatives would help ensure that the cost of the economic transformation is borne primarily by the super-rich and the greatest polluters, making them socially acceptable. Today young, working and marginalised people in Europe are being hit hardest by inflation while the effective tax rate faced by the wealthiest individuals is lower than the one faced by the middle class. Even if national authorities would implement these tax options, introduction should be coordinated at EU level to reduce the scope for aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance within the EU. The revenues raised should be earmarked for national budgets, repaying NGEU debt and mobilising additional resources for the next EU budget, including support for partner countries. 

After four years of suspension of the EU fiscal rules, the European Commission may propose to suspend them again for investments in defence, evidencing that they are ill-suited to the challenges of the 21st century. Crucially, even if such suspension happens, it must go hand in hand with tangible progress to raise additional resources. This is the only way to make sure these investments are not made at the expense of green, social and global commitments, and that resources will be available in time to service national and EU public debt.

Now is the time for courage and a clear direction for Europe in this extraordinarily challenging geo-political context. We count on your determination and long-term vision.

Yours Sincerely,

• Els Hertogen, Director, 11.11.11;

• Cécile Quéval, EU advocacy adviser, Action contre la Faim;

• Kasia Lemanska, EU Representative, Aidsfonds;

• Nuno Barroso, President, APIT Portugal;

• Chiara Martinelli, Director, Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe;

• Arnaud Zacharie, Secretary General, CNCD-11.11.11;

• Tanya Cox, Director, CONCORD;

• Olivier Bruyeron, President, Coordination SUD;

• Juliana Wahlgren, Director, European Anti-Poverty Network;

• Patrizia Heidegger, Deputy Secretary General, European Environmental Bureau;

• Jan Willem Goudriaan, General Secretary, The European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU);

• Rareș Voicu, President, European Youth Forum;

• Valentina Barbagallo, EU Representative, Global Citizen;

• Petra Totterman-Andorff, Secretary General, The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation;

• Sebastian Mang, Senior Programme Manager, New Economics Foundation;

• Evelien van Roemburg, Head of Oxfam's EU Office, Oxfam ;

• Eloise Todd, Executive Director, Pandemic Action Network ;

• Morgane Créach, Director General, Réseau Action Climat;

ANNEX: THREE ADDITIONAL TAXATION OPTIONS TO CONSIDER IN THE DEBATE ON EU OWN RESOURCES

• Tax on extreme wealth: Wealth concentration at the top has reached unprecedented levels. In 2022, the wealthiest 1% held a quarter of the net personal wealth in the EU, compared with 3.2% of wealth owned by the bottom 50%. Moreover, younger generations face significant barriers to wealth accumulation due to rising housing costs, student debt, and precarious employment. Interest in taxing the super-rich is growing at national, regional, and global levels. In November 2024, the G20 governments agreed to cooperate on taxing the ultra-rich and ahead of the July G20 ministerial meeting, several organisations presented a petition with over 1.5 million signatures worldwide calling to tax the ultra-wealthy. More than 350.000 signatures have been collected through the European Citizens Initiative for a European wealth tax from October 2023 to October 2024. A tax on extreme wealth is also one of the measures needed to avoid the generalization of plutocracies and the destruction of checks and balances inherent to democratic societies. The EU has historically worked to combat tax evasion, avoidance, and harmful tax practices, as seen in initiatives such as the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) and efforts against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). A coordinated EU-wide extreme wealth tax would close loopholes that ultra-rich exploit by shifting income and assets across Member States to avoid their fiscal responsibilities, preventing fragmented enforcement. Estimates, mentioned by the European Commission in its yearly taxation report, indicate that a yearly wealth tax of up to 5% on Europe's multimillionaires and billionaires could bring 286.5 billion euro each year. We encourage you to call for and then agree on the introduction of a pan-European tax on extreme wealth and, pending an agreement at the EU level, the introduction of net wealth taxes at the national level. We also urge you to support ongoing efforts to tax extreme wealth at the global level, for example supporting the new G20 agenda on taxing the super-rich and the taxation of high-net-worth individuals under the new UN Tax Convention. 

• Tax on the profits of the fossil fuel industry: Fossil fuel companies have made record profits over the last years and are among the most responsible for pollution and climate change – which generate exponential costs and risks for public budgets. In the 12 months leading to July 2023, the 14 biggest fossil fuel companies collectively made USD 278 billion in net profits, up by 278% compared to the previous period. A tax on the profits of fossil fuel companies could address market distortions and incentivise investments in the green transition. In 2022, the EU reached an agreement and implemented a temporary windfall profit solidarity contribution on companies in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors which were generating at least 75% of their turnover from the extraction, mining, refining of petroleum or manufacture of coke oven products. A tax on the profits of the fossil fuel industry could build on this precedent. In 2022, EU member states raised an estimated €17.5 billion. Alternatively, a top-up tax on the corporate minimum tax, applied only to fossil fuel companies, appears to be another promising option. We urge you to call on the European Commission to make a proposal to tax the fossil fuel industry’s profits, while assessing the expected return, and flanking measures required to ensure the cost is not passed on to households and companies.

• Kerosene and air tickets taxes: The aviation sector as a whole accounts for approximately 11% of CO2 emissions from transport and has been one of the fastest-growing greenhouse gas emitting sectors. Non-CO2 impacts are also very significant. Jet fuel goes largely untaxed, due to a tax exemption on kerosene which dates back to 1944. Two proposals could address this: taxing kerosene and applying a levy on ticket sales. Introducing a kerosene tax of €0,33/l at European level via the Energy Taxation Directive, would generate almost €27 billion in revenues every year. For non-EU flights, this requires a re-negotiation of the tax exemption clauses in the Chicago Convention or bilateral agreements, while intra-EU and domestic flights could be taxed right away. According to a leaked report for the European Commission such a tax would have no net impact on jobs or the overall economy. However, we would rather support more socially acceptable options (as opposed to a flat tax) such as a levy only on business- and first-class flights, or a frequent flier levy. Examples include taxing flights with a levy of €20 on economy class and €180 on business class tickets, and a progressive levy starting at $9 for the second flight per year and rising to $177 at the twentieth ticket per year. According to the European network Stay Grounded, a frequent flyer levy could raise an extra 63,6 billion euros per year. 

Key Takeaways from the European Commission Communication on the MFF

Article by Kasia Lemanska, Aidsfonds EU Representative; Valentina Barbagallo, Global Citizen EU Representative; Emily Wigens, The ONE Campaign EU Director; and Eloise Todd, Pandemic Action Network Executive Director & Co-Founder

On February 11, the European Commission published The Road to the Next Multiannual Financial Framework. The Communication outlines the direction of travel ahead of the proposal that the Commission plans to publish in July 2025, and makes a case for a much-needed stronger EU budget.

The scale of challenges Europe faces—many of them global—demands a budget that is future-proof and substantially larger. This is especially true for external action: as highlighted in the Niinistö report, the EU must invest in mutual resilience with partners. The Communication rightly points out that less than 20% of the Sustainable Development Goals targets are on track, humanitarian needs are rising, and climate-related disasters are becoming more frequent and severe, with devastating social and economic costs. As Niinistö put it: “Strengthening partners’ capacity to prevent, withstand, or effectively respond to extreme weather events, health crises, hybrid campaigns, cyberattacks, or the flaring up of armed conflict also lowers the risk of cascading or spillover effects for Europe.”  It is therefore clear that investing in development and climate action is not just a moral imperative; it is a strategic necessity. To position itself as the partner of choice and build mutual resilience, the EU must scale up investment in development and climate action to at least €200 billion.

However, revamping the EU budget should not fix what is not broken. A potential merger of external action instruments would leave Europe and our partners less safe and less prosperous in an increasingly unpredictable world. While flexibility is important, what has hampered the ability of the NDICI - Global Europe to match the EU’s ambitions has been the lack of resources and forced trade-offs. The Communication recognizes the importance of predictability for long-term investments. This is particularly true for development aid, where reliable, sustained funding makes the EU a trusted partner — critical in an era of uncertainty and essential for forging the mutually beneficial partnerships the EU seeks.

The Communication also highlights the need to modernize revenues, particularly through own resources, not least to reimburse joint EU borrowing via Next Generation EU, which could leave a hole equivalent to 20% of the current budget. Beyond the proposals currently on the table, the EU must take advantage of discussions on a fresh approach to the budget and introduce new own resources — particularly targeting the most polluting sectors, which must contribute their fair share at a time of constrained resources. This will be crucial not only for repaying joint borrowing but also for ensuring that the EU can continue investing in its own future — one that is inseparable from the future of its partners.

Refinement, Not Overhaul: External action in the next MFF

Joint position paper from 33 organizations

To effectively address global challenges, the EU must significantly increase its investment in external action in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)[1], in the context of a larger EU budget. In the push for greater simplification and flexibility in the MFF, the external action heading should be a positive example to others, having already undergone significant simplification during the last budget cycle. The NDICI-Global Europe instrument (NDICI-GE), in particular, has demonstrated its ability to deliver the EU’s objectives.

This paper sets out a series of recommendations to maximize the efficiency and impact of the EU’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) investments so that they can advance sustainable development, global climate action, human rights, and strengthen global security and stability. By adopting ambitious targets the EU can guarantee that every Euro spent delivers tangible results.

Overall architecture 

According to the 2024 independent mid-term evaluation of the EU’s external instruments, the NDICI-GE is fit for purpose and effectively delivers on its objectives. It enables the EU to promote its internal policies and priorities in a more coherent manner externally, while offering significant added value through a more integrated, sizable, and coordinated approach to external relations compared to the previous MFF. This approach has strengthened partner countries’ capacity to address joint priorities with the EU and tackle global challenges.

The evaluation also highlights that current instruments have increased the collective engagement of European actors in EU external cooperation through the Team Europe approach. Moreover, the flexibility features of the NDICI-GE have proven highly relevant in pursuing EU priorities and providing targeted support to partner countries.

• We do not recommend an overhaul of the EU’s external action architecture but rather continuity with targeted improvements.

DAC-ability 

As set out in the Lisbon treaty, the primary goal of EU development cooperation is poverty alleviation. The best way to ensure that the EU’s development cooperation instrument contributes to this objective is to maximize its “DAC-ability”, currently set at at least 93%. We recommend: 

• Maintaining the future instrument’s DAC-ability at at least 93%. 

• Ensuring that the primary objective of the future instrument remains poverty reduction and eradication. 

The EU has developed a series of robust policies, such as the Consensus on Development, the Gender Action Plan, the Youth Action Plan, the EU Global Health Strategy, and the Human Rights Action Plan. These draw on extensive expertise both within and outside EU institutions. We therefore recommend:

• Ensuring that the future instrument’s policy basis is grounded in these key EU policies and strategies.

Aid effectiveness principles

In response to the mid-term review of the NDICI-GE, the Council found that increased efforts should be made to reinforce local ownership, in particular among communities, local and regional authorities and civil society organisations. Upholding ownership, alongside other aid effectiveness principles, is essential for maximizing the impact of EU Official Development Assistance (ODA) and fostering effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. We recommend:

• Ensuring that aid effectiveness principles are applied across all aid modalities in the future instrument.

Boosting thematic investments 

Whilst it is important to reinforce the “geographisation” principle with a strong and well-resourced geographic programme driven by the needs and priorities of partner countries and their citizens, thematic programmes, such as those addressing global challenges, human rights and democracy, peace, stability and conflict prevention, preparedness and civil society, must be adequately funded and independent from geographic programmes. The persistent underfunding of these programmes under the current NDICI-GE framework severely limits their impact and undermines the objective of the flexible funding in the cushion. For example, the current Global Challenges programme is under-financed and has consistently required top-ups from the cushion to cover its priorities. We are therefore calling for: 

• Maintaining all existing thematic programmes, which must be sufficiently funded to enable the EU to effectively address cross-border issues and global priorities. 

Balancing flexibility with predictability

Flexibility is essential for responding to emerging priorities and crises in partner countries. It allows for swift action in unforeseen crises and political shifts, as well as in aligning development efforts with the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. However, increased flexibility should complement, rather than replace, predictability. Predictability is crucial for sustainable development and peacebuilding, as it enables long-term systemic reforms and investments that address the root causes of poverty, violence, inequality, and lack of opportunity. We’re therefore calling for:

• Maintaining the cushion to ensure flexibility and enhance the EU’s ability to respond to emerging priorities and crises in partner countries. 

• Ensuring its transparent and accountable use. 

• Greater flexibility in the new external action budget to be additional to predictable funding. 

Human Development

Partner countries value the EU’s leadership in human development investments[2], enhancing Europe’s influence and partnerships with key regions—critical for the success of the Global Gateway. These investments are both a moral imperative and a strategic priority, saving lives, empowering individuals, and creating the enabling environment for sustainable economic development and prosperity.

The EU’s longstanding commitment to allocating at least 20% of ODA to human development is a key pillar of its development policy. This commitment, reaffirmed in the 2017 European Consensus on Development, has been consistently endorsed by Member States, most recently in June 2024[3], and the European Parliament[4]. We therefore urge the EU to: 

• Maintain its commitment to dedicate at least 20% of its ODA to human development and social inclusion.

ODA to Least Developed Countries and Fragile States

EU ODA should be targeted where the needs are greatest. However, in 2023, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which represent 13% of the world’s population and 1.3% of global GDP[5], received just 11.1% of EU ODA[6], falling to its lowest proportion ever. This must be corrected in the next MFF. Similarly, global poverty is increasingly located in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), with 44% of people living in extreme poverty located in FCAS in 2022, and projections indicating this share could rise to 60% by 2030[7].  We are therefore calling for:

• 50% of the EU’s bilateral ODA in the next MFF to be allocated to LDCs and FCAS

Climate

A decade after the Paris Agreement, the promises made to protect our planet remain unfulfilled. Despite global commitments, including most recently that of channelling at least $300 billion a year in international climate finance by 2035 and a call to all actors to scale up funds from all public and private sources to at least $1.3 trillion, these sums are inadequate against the estimates of the trillions needed by developing countries to ensure renewable energy access, just transitions to decarbonised economies, adapt to  the impacts of climate change, and address their loss and damage. Currently the EU is lagging behind on its climate targets, with investments within the NDICI-GE amounting to 23.8% in 2021-23[8] compared to the 30% target set out in the regulation. The EU must agree the following:

• A binding spending target of 50% across external funding as climate- and biodiversity related, of which 35% should be dedicated to climate. 

• Out of the 35% climate spending, equal support should be given to mitigation, adaptation and addressing loss and damage. Finance to dedicated adaptation projects should increase, particularly through grants-based funding, as well as an improved approach to mainstreaming adaptation, for example supporting agroecology and using nature-based approaches where feasible to maximise co-benefits. 

• Finance to address  loss and damage should increase through grants, include contributions to the new Fund for Addressing Loss and Damage, and there should be robust tracking of spending and no double-counting between loss and damage, adaptation finance, and humanitarian aid.

• Particular attention should be paid to directing climate adaptation finance toward climate-vulnerable, conflict-affected countries because of the low share of adaptation finance they currently receive and the particular challenges posed by the interplay between climate change, conflict and fragility. 

• Improve climate mainstreaming methodology through improved climate tracking and an ex ante approach to targets in programming, alignment of support to enhance and implement countries’ climate plans (nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans), stronger integration of climate action across sectors, and support to producing countries and smallholders in particular to comply with European Green Deal regulations with an external impact.

• Strengthening safeguards for international cooperation through application of stricter ‘do no harm’ criteria, social and human rights safeguards and mandatory environmental and climate impact assessments across all Team Europe Initiatives and Global Gateway programs. These should ensure all activities are compatible with biodiversity goals,  the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degree Celsius goal and ensure any climate risks are assessed and addressed so that projects are ‘adaptation-proof’.  Any direct or indirect support for fossil fuels must be excluded fully. 

Biodiversity

The EU must recognize nature’s essential role in sustaining communities, economies, and climate resilience. To show true global leadership, the EU should address interconnected challenges—biodiversity loss, climate change, environmental degradation, health risks, and rising insecurity—while actively conserving critical ecosystems, supporting sustainable development, and alleviating poverty. Biodiversity loss, particularly in vulnerable regions, fuels conflict, displacement, and migration, undermining stability, whereas healthy ecosystems are essential for achieving SDGs and ensuring food security, water access, and climate resilience. The next international cooperation budget should prioritise biodiversity conservation and nature-based solutions, recognizing the long-term value and cost-effectiveness of investing in nature[9]. We therefore urge the EU to raise its ambition by:

• A spending target of 50% across external funding as climate and biodiversity related, of which 15% should be earmarked to biodiversity, dedicated exclusively to biodiversity objectives, distinct from climate and other environmental goals.

• Mainstream biodiversity across all international cooperation sectors, integrating biodiversity into agriculture, climate adaptation, infrastructure, and value chains, and promoting nature-based solutions in these areas.

• Prioritize grant-based financing for biodiversity while leveraging the Global Gateway to attract private investment in conservation and nature restoration. This will help scale impactful solutions for nature and communities while building the technical capacity to de-risk investments in biodiversity and nature-based solutions. Strengthen environmental safeguards across all Global Gateway initiatives by mandating the ‘Do No Significant Harm’ (DNSH) principle and environmental impact assessments to minimize negative impacts on biodiversity and ensure compliance with the Global Biodiversity Framework.

• Expand support to Indigenous Peoples and local communities to improve biodiversity and climate funding absorption, effectiveness, and long-term ownership, funding mechanisms must be adapted to enable greater participation from diverse groups that play a crucial role in on-the-ground conservation efforts.

Food and nutrition security

The world produces more than enough to feed everyone on the planet[10], yet, since 2017 hunger has increased sharply with persistent challenges such as slow reductions in child stunting, wasting, and low birthweight, alongside increasing rates of anemia[11]. The agrifood sector is key for most low-income countries’ socioeconomic development[12], and a sustainable transition of that sector also holds a central role in addressing the climate crisis. 

The EU is committed to ensuring the right to adequate food for all and must honor the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil that right. We are therefore calling on the EU to:

• Provide earmarked funding for food and nutrition security, prioritising agroecological principles[13], nutrition outcomes and gender equality in food systems. 

• Ensure participation by small-scale producers’ organizations in programme identification, formulation and implementation. 

Gender equality

Gender equality is a key enabler for ensuring that EU ODA delivers against its objectives, including poverty and inequalities reduction. In order to make the EU’s international partnerships effective, discriminatory social and gendered norms must be eradicated.

Gender equality is a core value of the EU[14] and the Union has made ambitious commitments to promote gender equality through all its external actions in its Gender Action Plan III. OECD DAC 2021-2022 data shows that less than 1% of total ODA was directed towards women’s rights organizations and feminist movements while they are critical actors to change harmful gender and social norms, protect rights and uphold democracy, achieve gender equality and sustainable development. Gender equality investments should operate in ways consistent with feminist principles[15], be traceable in a transparent way and incorporate robust accountability mechanisms, building up on experiences of some member states with mechanisms for support to feminist civil society organisations such as the Dutch ‘Leading from the South’ and the French ‘Fonds de Soutien aux Organisations Feministes’[16]. We therefore urge the EU to:

• Strengthen the current gender equality targets by expressing them in terms of volumes of funding and increasing attention to gender-targeted actions: the strengthened gender equality targets should therefore be 85% of ODA going to projects that have gender equality as a significant or principal objective (G1 + G2) and 20% of ODA going to projects which have gender equality as their principal objective (G2)[17].

• Increase funding for women’s rights organisations, networks, and funds by ensuring that at least 25% of gender equality principal investments (G2) are channeled through these entities over the next financial cycle of the MFF. This would result in 5% of total bilateral ODA flowing through them.  

• Integrate a gender budgeting approach into all funding instruments and budget lines of the next MFF

• Ensure that EU external funding instruments align with gender equality commitments by establishing adequate modalities. This will enable the effective implementation of the EU Gender Action Plans and MFF gender targets

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding

The EU has played a critical role in fostering global stability through its support to civil society and locally led initiatives to prevent violence and promote peace. Preventing and addressing violent conflict is not only a moral imperative but also a strategic and economic necessity.
The cost of conflict was €18.2 trillion in 2023, equivalent to 13.5% of the world’s economic activity, or €2,266 per person[18]. Today’s conflicts are disrupting critical supply chains, forcing the displacement of over 117 million people, 40% of them being children[19], exacerbating impacts of the climate crisis, and creating conditions for transnational crime and armed groups to thrive. These trends highlight the urgent need for cooperative, comprehensive strategies to address interconnected global challenges. As such, we urge the EU to: 

• Include conflict prevention and peacebuilding as objectives in all External Financing Instruments. 

• Ensure that peacebuilding objectives are integrated into all pillars of the future NDICI-GE, including the geographic pillar, rapid response pillar and the cushion. 

• Ringfence funding to conflict prevention and peacebuilding to ensure these funds cannot be diverted to serve shifting, short-term political interests.

• Enhance the linkages between flexible crisis response mechanisms and longer-term programming. 

• Ensure that all EU external action, including the Global Gateway strategy, is conflict- and gender-sensitive.

Humanitarian Aid

United around the commitment to providing assistance to people in need, the EU, together with its Member States, is one of the world’s leading donors of principled humanitarian aid. Humanitarian assistance addresses immediate, life-saving needs in crisis situations and adheres to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence. These principles are essential for maintaining trust and access in conflict/crisis affected zones.

In the current MFF, humanitarian assistance represents a little less than 1% of the EU expenses, however this is insufficient and does not cover the bare minimum to maintain the same level of EU supported programming. As such, each year requires reinforcements of the budget from other instruments such as the Emergency Aid Reserve (EAR). We therefore urge the EU to maintain its ambition by:

• Preserving the separate instrument and budget line for humanitarian assistance within the new MFF structure to guarantee principled humanitarian action.

• Allocating at least €18.2 billion for humanitarian assistance within the MFF with an annual baseline of €2.6 billion to ensure a predictable and sufficient budget for immediate responses to crises.

Emergency Aid reserve

Despite a constant increase in humanitarian needs, they remain challenging to fully anticipate. In this context, reserves are essential to alleviate suffering and save lives. During the current budget cycle, EU humanitarian aid has been heavily dependent on funding from the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) and the EAR[20].  

The next MFF should maintain the EAR and the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) separately. The EAR and the EUSF should have the same allocations and these should be ring fenced to preserve the external strand. Furthermore, humanitarian response should have priority access to the EAR ensuring predictability to enable EU partners to join EU’s humanitarian response. The failure of the EU to take this opportunity may have catastrophic consequences for crisis-affected communities. Therefore, the EU must:

• Maintain the Emergency Aid Reserve. 

• Allocate 50% of the solidarity fund to the EAR with a minimum of €600 million annually. 

Implementation of the triple nexus humanitarian-development-peace

While we recommend keeping separate instruments and budgets for humanitarian and development action, we recognise there is a need to establish strong, strategic links in conducting joint analysis and, where possible, connecting humanitarian, development and peacebuilding operations in situations of emergency, conflicts, protracted crisis or fragility. The EU should stay engaged in conflict-affected settings, including in settings with de facto authorities, and uphold its commitments to the operationalisation of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus[21], which the EU and OECD DAC have recognised as essential to have an effective and sustainable response to complex crises[22].

The Council stressed the importance of a strong and coordinated Team Europe engagement in fragile contexts and welcomed the variety of tools offered by the NDICI-GE to do so, including through geographic programming and the Rapid Response Pillar[23]. We recommend the EU maintains a rapid response funding stream that enables resilience building actions and the implementation of the triple nexus in crisis contexts. The EU must ensure allocations to this rapid response funding stream are needs driven, conflict sensitive and crisis responsive. We urge the EU to:

• Ensure there is adequate development funding for states and populations affected by conflicts.

• Ensure there are guarantees to protect principled humanitarian actors within nexus approaches and that decisions are taken based on needs and vulnerabilities and not based on political considerations.

• Maintain its commitment to strengthening resilience and linking humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding, through funding rapid response actions and inclusion in relevant geographic and thematic programmes, while ensuring respect of humanitarian principles.

• Establish longer-term funding strategies, including for humanitarian aid and for peacebuilding, with multi-year programming and multi-year funding options in protracted crises, while giving those implementing the strategies more flexibility for adapting quickly to changing circumstances on the ground. 

• Ensure local, national and international CSOs are actively involved and supported at all levels in decision making on triple nexus and resilience programming, given their proximity to populations.

Preparedness

The interconnectedness of societies, economies, and challenges is undeniable, and solutions to the most pressing issues can only be achieved through joint efforts. Last year, former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö highlighted the need for the EU to prioritize mutual resilience in its diplomacy and external action in order to enhance the EU’s preparedness and readiness for future crises. His report urged the EU to work to elevate the bloc  “as a trusted and reliable partner in a world marked by growing strategic competition.” 

Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic showcased the unprecedented ability to rapidly develop medical countermeasures, driven by prior public-private investments and collaborations, but also exposed critical gaps in global pandemic preparedness and response (PPR), especially in equitable access to medical countermeasures in the Global South. 

To better address ongoing and future threats, the EU must prioritise comprehensive PPR investments, including in R&D, manufacturing, affordable access, and health systems strengthening to advance universal health coverage (UHC) in the Global South. The EU should therefore:

• Prioritize predictable, long-term, and sustainable investments in preparedness and resilience to support strategy implementation.

• Maintain the Global Challenges thematic programme and increase its funding in order to strengthen health systems and access to medical countermeasures via partnerships like the Global Fund, UNICEF, and Gavi, and stimulate local demand through market-shaping efforts via Unitaid and other multilaterals.

• Expand health R&D capacities and partnerships in the Global South through initiatives like CEPI, Global Health EDCTP3, and Glopid-R.

Enhancing CSO participation in EU international cooperation

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play a crucial role in implementing EU development cooperation, while EU funding remains a vital resource for many CSOs. However, recent shifts in EU cooperation programmes under NDICI have limited CSOs' ability to contribute effectively, reducing both funding diversity and access. Structural barriers, including a reliance on indirect management—delegating funds to EU Member States and international agencies—have further restricted fair participation. This, combined with limited EU administrative capacity, has hindered CSOs from fully engaging in EU-funded programmes[24].

CSOs are both advocates and key service providers, amplifying marginalized voices and advancing the 2030 Agenda’s "leave no one behind" commitment. To maximize their impact on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), CSOs require stronger, more inclusive support throughout NDICI-GE. While the EU recognises CSOs as dialogue partners, effective collaboration demands structured, transparent mechanisms, including regular consultations and diverse funding opportunities adapted to funding opportunities implemented through the Team Europe approach and the Global Gateway strategy. We therefore call on the EU to:

• Earmark a spending target of 15% of CSO budgets across the future development cooperation instrument.

• Ensure accessibility of funding in indirect management and Global Gateway initiatives by mandating CSO involvement and sub-grants.

• Establish long-term cooperation frameworks for diverse CSOs.

• Expand direct and simplified funding for local CSOs and broader civil society in partner countries[25].

• Revise EU financial regulation to enhance flexibility and align CSO funding mechanisms with new initiatives and adapted implementing modalities.

Addressing inequalities intersectionally

Horizontal dimensions of inequality (group-based) must be addressed together with vertical ones (wealth, income and consumption) in order to ensure intersectionality and meet the 2030 Agenda promises of Leaving No One Behind and reaching those furthest behind first. The EU’s Inequality Marker (I-Marker) adopted in 2023 is a significant step in that direction.

Yet, the EU currently sets no targets and there is no publicly available information of the marker scores reached by each programme and the analyses behind those estimates. 

The next MFF must embed the I-Marker to ensure meaningful and impactful implementation, including:

• At least 85% of EU programmes and 85% of EU funding should be allocated to programmes that reach scores I-1 or I-2. 

• As for the gender marker, we demand ambition on I-2 projects. Considering the current reported 13%, we call on the EU to step-up efforts on inequalities as a principal objective by setting an I-2 target of 40% in number of projects and funding.

• The three markers (gender, disability and inequality) must be implemented in complementarity. Combined use can improve the potential to address intersectional inequalities (for instance, reaching poorer women with disabilities in a community).

• To leave no one behind, all marginalised groups must be targeted in programme planning and implementation, such as children and young people, by using available markers and tools and considering new ones.

• Where projects are implemented in programme design, implementation and evaluation, both ex ante and ex post qualitative analyses are needed, in complementarity with the I-Marker. 

Migration

With respect to migration, it is essential that ODA is provided solely on the basis of the needs, and independently from any political consideration. Thus, any decision to fund actions related to external migration should be based on an ex-ante impact assessment and done in consultation with civil society, without diverting funds to countries along migration routes for migration management purposes. We urge the EU to:

• Reject the use of ODA for restrictive migration policies or border management in line with OECD DAC rules. Migration-related activities included in ODA should adhere to objectives and principles rooted in development, humanitarian, and human rights frameworks. These activities should generally align with the priorities of partner countries and their overarching development strategies. Activities that disregard the rights of forcibly displaced persons and migrants, or that primarily aim to intercept and return migrants to limit migration to provider countries, are excluded from ODA.

• Adopt a human rights-based approach that prioritises the dignity and safety of people, including children on the move. This includes funding for legal migration pathways, protection for displaced populations, and addressing the root causes of forced displacement, such as conflict, inequality, and environmental degradation.

• Include do no harm assessment in external migration funding, to inform any decision to fund actions related to external migration (management). Impact and conflict-sensitivity assessments have been consistently lacking in the EU’s external migration policies and funding. The ‘do no harm principle’ is currently aimed at minimising unintended negative consequences of humanitarian interventions, especially when it comes to protection. This should be extended to interventions related to external migration. Any policies or activities that lead to human rights violations should be avoided.

• Maintain and prioritize funding dedicated to addressing forced displacement, ensuring adequate resources to support displaced individuals and the communities hosting them, while fostering long-term solutions to this growing challenge.

Ukraine

Resolute in its response to Ukraine, as it must be, the EU must also demonstrate its staunch commitment to other partners with whom we must work in partnership in order to tackle global challenges. We are therefore calling for:

• Funding for Ukraine should be kept separate and be additional to the EU’s ODA commitments to the rest of the world.

EFSD+

The EU should maintain a balanced approach to funding modalities in recognition of the fact  that different partner countries have different investment needs, and that budget support and grants are effective funding mechanisms.

References

1. “A budget that delivers for people and planet” (November 2024)

2. Why does human development matter to the EU’s strategic priorities? - ECDPM (May 2024)

3. Council Conclusions on the Mid-Term Evaluation of the NDICI-Global Europe external financing instrument (June 2024)

4. European Parliament report on the Implementation of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (December 2023)

5. À propos des pays les moins avancés, United Nations (October 2021) 

6. Les profils de coopération au développement, OECD (2023)).

7. New estimates of the cost of ending poverty and its global distribution, UNU WIDER  (July 2024)

8. 2024 annual report on the implementation of the European Union’s external action instruments in 2023 (December 2024)

9. Joint statement - NEXT EU EXTERNAL BUDGET: Investing in nature and people is key to delivering the Global Biodiversity Framework, Paris Agreement and SDGs, WWF and 20 NGOs (November 2024)

10. Current global food production is sufficient to meet human nutritional needs in 2050 provided there is radical societal adaptation M. Berners-Lee, C. Kennelly, R. Watson and C.N. Hewitt. (2018)=

11. Today, up to 757 million people worldwide face hunger and about 2,8 billion people cannot afford a healthy diet.  The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024: Financing to End Hunger, Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in All Its Forms, FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO (2024)

12. The agricultural sector remains of fundamental importance in most low-income countries, and in Africa, for example, 62% of employment is in agrifood systems. Working Paper, Estimating Global and Country Level Employment in Agrifood Systems, FAO (2023)

13. As it is recognized by the Council Conclusions of 14 October 2024 on desertification and land degradation, the transformation of food systems is urging and must be “based on the 13 principles of agroecology defined by the High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security”.

14. Art. 2, 3(3) and 21 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), Art. 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and Art. 21 and 23 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

15. Common Ask Framework – English version – Walking the Talk

16. From talking to walking - Foundation for European Progressive Studies (December 2024)

17. Funding Local Womens Rights Organisations for Transformative Change, CONCORD Europe (2024)

18. Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Institute for Economics and Peace (2024)     

19. Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2023, UNHCR (2024)

20. The 2024 MFF revision adopted the division of the SEAR into two financial instruments, the EUSF and EAR, it entered into force in 2024. Under the current MFF, funds mobilised for external action under the SEAR have ranged from €334M in 2021 (15% of the final humanitarian budget), to €539M in 2022 (21%) and reached €579M in 2023 (24%). In 2024, the EAR annual allocation of €572M was fully transferred to the humanitarian aid budget line (fully depleted by September), starting at €1,819M to reach €2,391M Proposal for transfer of appropriations No DEC 10/2024 within Section III - Commission - of the general budget for 2024 (September 2024)

21. Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus - Council conclusions (19 May 2017)

22. OECD DAC Recommendation on the  Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (2025)

23. Mid-Term Evaluation of the NDICI-Global Europe external financing instrument - Council conclusions (24 June 2024)

24. Who holds the lion's share? A closer look at Global Europe Funds for CSOs - CONCORD (October 2023)

25. Who Holds the Lion’s Share, CONCORD Europe (2024)

Uphold EU Global Leadership: Reject the Merger of External Financing Instruments

Dear President von der Leyen,

Your leadership has been instrumental in ensuring the EU remains a global force for stability, sustainability and shared prosperity. These areas are part of Europe’s DNA, enshrined in our treaties. With the U.S. retreating from its global commitments, Europe must stay the course as a beacon of ambitious, principled leadership – building bridges, upholding multilateralism, and forging partnerships.

Ahead of the upcoming communication on the next Multiannual Financial Framework, we urge you to champion a well-resourced budget for development and climate action and to reject the proposed merger of external action instruments [1].

Each external instrument serves a distinct and crucial purpose. Humanitarian action must remain impartial, neutral, and independent to maintain trust and access in conflict zones. Development funding requires strategic, long-term planning to foster sustainable development, peace, and global partnerships, and pre-accession assistance is vital for democratic reforms.

A single, merged instrument risks forcing damaging trade-offs that would weaken the EU’s credibility as a reliable partner. It would blur the instruments’ important distinctions, jeopardizing the predictability and impact of EU engagement with strategic partners. This would be a lose-lose situation.

You have been a champion of multilateralism. Staying the course means protecting Europe’s ability to effectively and proudly operate in the world, and securing robust funding for these essential tools for global engagement. Once again, we count on your leadership.

[1] The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) - Global Europe, the Humanitarian Aid Instrument (HUMA), and the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA).

CSOs position on the potential merger of the NDICI-GE, IPA and HUMA

We have been informed of a proposal by DG BUDG to merge the EU’s development and international cooperation instrument (NDICI), humanitarian aid instrument (HUMA), and instrument for pre-accession (IPA) into a single instrument. This proposal includes a limited number of budget lines and an annual allocation process that would replace programming for the NDICI. This change is reportedly aimed at increasing flexibility.

While we acknowledge the need for the EU to adapt to global and domestic challenges, we believe such an overhaul risks undermining the EU's ability to achieve its objectives and honor its commitments. Flexibility is essential for responding to unforeseen challenges, but it must be balanced with predictable funding to ensure the EU can meet its long-term goals and maintain accountability for its expenditures.

We oppose this merger for several reasons:

1. IMPACT: the merger would reduce each instrument’s impact

Maintaining separate instruments enables the EU to effectively pursue its humanitarian, development, and enlargement objectives without compromising their integrity, focus, or visibility. It also provides the flexibility needed to tailor actions to specific contexts. Each instrument serves a distinct purpose and operates within dedicated principles and frameworks.

Merging these instruments into a single framework risks undermining their unique objectives and effectiveness:

Humanitarian action: Humanitarian aid addresses immediate, life-saving needs in crisis situations and adheres to the principles of neutrality, independence, and impartiality, as enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. These principles are essential for maintaining trust and access in conflict zones. EU humanitarian aid must remain free from political, strategic, military, or economic objectives. 

• Integrating humanitarian aid with instruments like the NDICI-GE or IPA would risk politicizing it, undermining its neutrality, and damaging the EU's credibility as an impartial provider of assistance. Such a merger could obscure its distinct role in delivering humanitarian support, ultimately weakening its global reputation as a principled actor in emergencies.

Development: The NDICI-GE supports long-term development through multi-year funding programs aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals and frameworks like the European Consensus on Development. Maintaining a separate, programmable instrument—enhanced by flexibility features such as the cushion for emerging priorities—ensures greater impact and avoids the risk of diverting resources to short-term needs or unrelated policy areas.

• A unified instrument could dilute the NDICI-GE’s focus, making it more difficult to achieve development goals, and reduce the visibility of the EU’s contributions to global challenges.

• An annual allocation process would likely dismantle the Team Europe approach, reducing the coherence and impact of EU action. It would disrupt predictability, and hinder partner countries' ability to plan effectively, ultimately compromising long-term progress. 

• A merger would jeopardize the existence of benchmarks and targets that have been instrumental in steering funding toward long-standing EU development priorities. These benchmarks have also enhanced the EU’s visibility as a leader in areas such as gender equality and human development. Without them, the EU’s contributions to critical development objectives risk becoming more ad hoc, lacking a clear trajectory.

Pre-accession: IPA III is specifically designed to help candidate and potential candidate countries prepare for EU membership by supporting institutional reforms, alignment with EU laws, and capacity-building. This instrument ensures adherence to strict criteria for governance, democracy, and the rule of law.

• Merging IPA with broader instruments risks redirecting funds to other priorities, potentially slowing enlargement progress. 

• Treating accession countries under the same framework as development partners could provoke resistance, as these countries have a more advanced and distinct relationship with the EU.

• A unified approach could blur the EU’s role in enlargement, weaken its influence, and further delay integration.

2. FUNDING: The merger would force complex trade-offs and potentially reduce funding

If the European Commission consolidates three smaller instruments into one large framework, it might create the impression of substantial funding for external action. However, this approach increases the risk of budget cuts during negotiations, potentially leaving less funding available for each specific purpose.

On an annual basis, managing trade-offs would become increasingly complex. Humanitarian crises could require immediate reallocation of funds, potentially diverting resources from long-term development programs or pre-accession assistance. Accession-related needs - difficult to predict but expected to grow as the EU expands eastward - might further strain development and humanitarian aid budgets.

If Member States perceive that humanitarian aid is being compromised, they may choose to channel their contributions bilaterally, undermining the EU’s collective response. 

3. CREDIBILITY: a single instrument could jeopardize the EU’s reputation as a credible and reliable partner, and well as erode EU’s citizens trust 

• The mid-term revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework demonstrated that reallocating long-term development funds from partner countries to address immediate political priorities poses significant reputational risks. Further reallocations, such as diverting development funds to support wealthier countries’ EU accession, could exacerbate criticism and distrust from external partners - at a time when strong partnerships are crucial for achieving the EU’s internal and external objectives.

• A transactional approach that prioritizes short-term goals like migration management and investment risks alienating fragile states, undermining the EU’s soft power, and eroding trust in its commitment to development goals. 

• Jeopardizing the EU’s ability to act effectively in each of these areas also carries significant reputational risk with EU citizens. EU citizens are staunch supporters of external action, with 91% of citizens believing it is important that the EU funds humanitarian activities[1] and 75% believe it's important that the EU invests in partner countries[2]. Undermining the EU’s ability to act in these areas could affect citizens’ support for the EU overall.

4. GOVERNANCE: complexity in governance and oversight - who decides?

Maintaining separate instruments ensures clearer accountability, enabling more straightforward scrutiny of funds and their impact. It is unclear who would provide the strategic steer for implementing a single, merged external instrument. Currently, each instrument operates with its own governance structure and accountability mechanisms, which are essential for ensuring transparency and effectiveness.

• A unified budget risks diluting this clarity, making it more challenging to assess the effectiveness of funding across development, humanitarian, and pre-accession areas.

• Merging these instruments could introduce significant governance challenges. It could complicate oversight and increase bureaucracy, slowing down decision-making processes - particularly for crisis response and humanitarian aid. While a single framework might provide greater flexibility for the European Commission, it would reduce the number of budget lines, limiting the European Parliament's ability to exercise robust oversight.

• Monitoring cross-cutting priorities like gender mainstreaming could become more complex, weakening the EU's commitment to these objectives.

• Member States and their working parties would face greater difficulties in tracking whether funds are being used effectively and for their intended purposes. 

• Public accountability, including oversight by civil society organizations, would also be weakened, as it would become harder to trace how funds are allocated and aligned with their objectives.

What do existing evaluations say?

NDICI

European Court of Auditors (ECA) 2019 opinion[3]

• The NDICI-GE successfully simplifies ways of working, enhances the coherence and consistency of its interventions. 
• It demonstrates greater flexibility in addressing unforeseen challenges and crises. 

ECA2023 Special Report[4]

• The NDICI-GE addressed issues such as overlapping aid, diverging objectives, and lack of flexibility, offering a more strategic approach. 
• A proper programming exercise is crucial to ensure that EU support addresses partner countries’ needs, while taking into account their commitment to carrying out reforms, their domestic capacity and contributions from other donors.

2024 independent mid-term evaluation of EU’s external instruments[5]

• The NDICI-GE remains fit for purpose, effectively delivering against its objectives. 
• The NDICI-GE serves as a key tool to roll out the Global Gateway strategy and enables the EU to promote its internal policies and priorities in a more coherent manner to the external world. 
• It brought significant added value by offering a more integrated, sizable, and coherent approach to external relations compared to the previous MFF, improving partner countries’ capacity to address joint priorities with the EU and tackle global challenges.
• Current instruments have increased the collective engagement of European actors in EU external cooperation through the Team Europe approach. 
• The various flexibility features of the NDICI-GE have proven their relevance in pursuing EU priorities and providing support to partner countries. 
• The important role of programming was also confirmed by the evaluation to identify shared priorities and set a strategic cooperation framework over a medium-term, thus giving some predictability to partner countries.
• The June 2024 Council Conclusions[6] on the NDICI-GE confirmed that the instrument enhances the EU’s geopolitical role. 

IPA

The mid-term evaluation of EU’s external financing instruments[7] found IPA III to be a holistic policy-first instrument, which mirrors the EU priorities and policy developments in preparing countries for the future membership of the Union. It has been effective in promoting socio-economic development and leveraging necessary investments, and it was flexible in responding to exceptional external events. It was also coherent with other areas of external action and EU internal policies.

References

1. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2976

2. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2952

3. Opinion No 10/2018 (pursuant to Article 322(1) TFEU) concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument [COM(2018) 460 final]

4. Programming the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe Comprehensive programmes with deficiencies in the methods for allocating funds and impact monitoring

5. Evaluation of the European Union’s External Financing Instruments (2014-2020 and 2021-2027)

6. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/council-approves-conclusions-on-the-mid-term-evaluation-of-the-ndici-global-europe-external-financing-instrument/

7. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0208

A budget that delivers for people and planet

Joint position paper of 46 organizations

In today’s world, the interconnectedness of societies, ecosystems, and economies is undeniable. Crises like climate change, pandemics, and conflicts transcend borders, affecting everyone, including EU citizens.

To effectively address both current and future crises, as well as setbacks in human rights, sustainable development and gender equality, the EU urgently needs additional resources. Investing in these efforts benefits both EU citizens and people worldwide, reinforcing global security and stability for all.

A bold, forward-looking budget will allow Europe and its partners to be better prepared and more resilient to shocks. For ODA investments to be truly impactful, the EU’s approach to international partnerships must be grounded in a rights-based framework that promotes human dignity, human security, and equity. The needs of people in partner countries, alongside the realization of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement, must guide collective efforts.

At the same time, the EU also stands to benefit from ODA investments. Strengthening the EU’s credibility as a genuine international partner helps promote the Union’s values and geopolitical interests. A more peaceful and equitable world is not only a moral goal but also a strategy for long-term prosperity.

This paper sets out why scaling EU ODA to at least €200 billion over the next MFF[1] is a smart investment:

• Europe as a credible, trusted partner: In a time of rising inequality, conflict, climate and health crises, and biodiversity loss, the EU's global commitments have never been more urgent. Historically, the EU has been a leader in tackling global challenges and advancing multilateralism. To remain credible and effective on the world stage, the EU must deliver on its international commitments and boost ODA[2] and climate financing. As other players become more assertive, these resources will afford the EU the ability to shape global action. Without a significant increase in ODA, the EU risks losing the trust of its partners at a time when strong alliances are essential for the future of Europe and of its partner countries.

• Preparedness and prevention cost less than a crisis: People in many of the EU’s partner countries face enormous challenges - from food insecurity, water scarcity and public health crises to the devastating impacts of conflict and climate change. Investing in prevention and preparedness saves lives and is cost-effective: the cost of inaction or delayed responses to climate-related disasters, early warning for conflict or pandemics far outweighs the cost of proactive measures. For instance, the OECD estimates that every $1 invested in conflict prevention helps save $16 down the road.[3] In 2020, scientists calculated the cost of preventing further pandemics over the next decade would amount to just 2% of the estimated financial damage caused by COVID-19.[4] It is therefore in the EU’s political and financial interest to confront the problems head-on by scaling investment in ODA to respond to - and get ahead of - crises.

• Greater resilience in an increasingly complex and polarized world: Investing in resilience -  including through climate adaptation, biodiversity protection, conflict prevention or pandemic preparedness - is critical to the EU's stability and competitiveness, while protecting its partners from climate shocks and health crises. These efforts not only save lives but also bolster global stability by mitigating risks and addressing the root causes of forced displacement, food insecurity and supply chains disruptions. These investments also safeguard the EU’s economic interests. 

• The added-value of unity: A united EU leveraging its collective resources, and channeling a portion of them via the EU budget, can achieve an impact larger than the sum of its parts. Acting together helps drive economies of scale, exploit synergies, obtain wider geographic reach and gives the EU greater ability to shape global action than Member States acting alone.

The bottom line is that global challenges require global cooperation, sustained action in fragile and conflict affected settings as well as substantial resources. Failure to adequately address these challenges is already having devastating impacts on livelihoods around the world and increasing the risk of conflicts, food insecurity and pandemics. Together, these crises could push an additional 132 million people into extreme poverty by 2030[5] whilst prolonging devastating conflicts, persecution and human rights violations which have forced 122.6 million people to flee their homes.[6]

We therefore urge the EU to:

• Invest at least €200 billion in ODA in the next MFF. To put that into context, the European Commission and Member States spent €3.7 trillion responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.[7]

• This amount should be additional to funding for Ukraine. Resolute in its response to Ukraine, as it must be, the EU must also demonstrate its staunch commitment to other partners with whom we must work in partnership in order to tackle global challenges.

• Ensure that greater flexibility in external action is additional to predictable funding. Flexibility is essential for responding to emerging priorities and crises in partner countries. It allows for swift action in unforeseen crises and political shifts, as well as in aligning development efforts with the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. However, increased flexibility should complement, rather than replace, predictability. Predictability is crucial for sustainable development, as it enables long-term systemic reforms that address the root causes of poverty, violence, inequality, and lack of opportunity.

[1] Calculated on the basis of EU Member States reaching their international ODA commitments by 2030 and retaining this level of investment through 2034, and assuming they continue to channel 23.1% of their ODA via the EU budget. Methodology available here.

[2] Council of the European Union, 2024 Annual Report to the European Council on EU Development Aid Targets, 24 June 2024

[3] OECD, States of Fragility 2020, 17 September 2020

[4] Andrew P. Dobson et al., Ecology and economics for pandemic prevention. 24 July 2020

[5] World Bank, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2022 

[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mid-Year Trends, 9 October 2024 

[7] ILO, COVID-19 EU response, 27 October 2021